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We present some categorical investigations into Wittgenstein’s
language-games, with applications to game-theoretic pragmatics
and question-answering in natural language processing.
Introduction
In his 1953 Philosophical Investigations [Wit53], Wittgenstein introduces the con-
cept of language-game (Sprachspiel) as a basis for his theory of meaning. He
never gives a general denition, and instead proceeds by enumeration of ex-
amples: “asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying”. Thus, depending on
the language-game in which it is played, the same utterance “Water!” can be
the answer to a question, a request to a waiter or the chorus of a song. This
has often been summarised by the slogan “meaning is use”, which became the
object of a subeld of linguistics: pragmatics. Since Lewis’ work on language
conventions [Lew69], formal game theory has been used to model speaker’s
and hearer’s actions in the context of a discourse [BS18]. In parallel, game the-
ory has been proven signicant in designing machine learning tasks [GPM+14]
and is beginning to be applied to natural language processing [SRD+17, TN19].
Category theory has been used to formalise both language and games. On
the one hand, the distributional compositional (DisCo) models of Coecke et al.
[CCS08, CCS10] dene language meaning as a functor from Lambek’s pregroup
grammars [Lam99] to compact-closed categories such as the category of vector
spaces and linear maps. On the other hand, Ghani et al. [GHWZ18] introduced
a monoidal category of open games as a compositional framework for game
theory. In [HL18], Hedges and Lewis proposed to construct language games as
functors from grammar to open games. However, their construction required
to depart from the pregroup formalism and relied on an open conjecture.
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This paper presents some categorical investigations into language games,
with applications to game-theoretic pragmatics. In the rst two sections, we
give an abstract denition of question-answering as an open game, then de-
ne pregroup grammars and DisCo models. The proposal of Hedges and Lewis
is reformulated within the pregroup formalism, using the free completion of
open games as a rigid monoidal category. Two examples of functorial lan-
guage games are presented: orders and questions, modelling the pragmatics of
imperative and interrogative syntax. The abstract question-answering game
of the rst section is instantiated with respect to a pregroup grammar: the
teacher’s moves are grammatical questions, the student’s strategies are DisCo
models. We characterise the Nash equilibria and identify sucient conditions
for the student to succeed. We conclude with a discussion of the link between
open games and learning algorithms for natural language processing.
1 Q&A as an open game
Open games [GHWZ18] are building blocks that can be composed together to
construct games in the sense of economic game theory. They provide a com-
positional description of game theory and a graphical syntax that facilitates
reasoning. They express the equilibria of composite games in terms of their
components, which might be more tractable.
Definition 1.1 ([GHWZ18, Definition 3]). Let X,S, Y,R ∈ Set. An open game G : (XS ) Σ9(Y
R
)
that takes observations on the set X, produces moves on the set Y , receives utilities
on the set R, and returns coutilities on the set S, is a quadruple (ΣG , piG , κG , EG) where:
• ΣG is the set of strategy profiles;
• piG : ΣG × X → Y is the play function, representing how the player following a
strategy profile produces a move given an observation;
• κG : ΣG×X×R→ S is the coplay function, representing how payoffs are propagated
from the player to its environment;
• EG : X × (Y → R) → P(ΣG) is the equilibrium function, representing the subset of
strategies that are best responses for the player in a given context, which consists of
a past observation of type X and a continuation of type Y → R.
Open games form a teleological symmetric monoidal category denotedGame,
which admits a graphical calculus developed in [Hed17]. Each morphism is
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represented as a box with covariant wires for observations and moves, and
contravariant wires for utilities and coutilities (see Diagram 1). Closed games
G : I → I are determined by a set of strategy proles ΣG together with an equi-
librium function EG : 1→ P(ΣG) describing a subset of equilibria. When consid-
ering games where players maximise their own utility, these equilibria are pre-
cisely Nash equilibria [GHWZ18, Theorem 2]. Every simultaneous move game,
in the sense of classical game theory, denes a closed game [GHWZ18, Section
VII]. Finally, every pair of play/coplay functions can be lifted into a game by
picking the trivial strategy set SG = 1 and a constantly true equilibrium func-
tion. Open games obtained in this way are called strategically trivial.
Example 1.2. Consider an agent q that poses questions, modelled as a state q :
(1
1
)
9
(Q
U
)
with a set of strategies given by Q. We pick some questions-answer pairs T ⊆ Q×U that
the agent finds satisfactory, and these preferences are modelled by defining its equilibrium
function to be
EG(f) := {q | (q, f(q)) ∈ T} .
It confronts some oracle that answers the questions, modelled as a strategically trivial
effect a :
(Q
U
)
9
(1
1
)
. Composing both gives a simple game where the agent tries to ask a
question and receive a satisfactory answer. The Nash equilibria of the composite game are
precisely the questions that the oracle answers satisfactorily.
Generalizing from this example, we can consider an abstract notion of utility-
maximising player.
Definition 1.3. A utility-maximising player with observations in X, moves in Y , utilities
in a partially ordered set R, and some subset of possible strategies Σ ⊆ Y X , is an open
game G : (X1 ) Σ9 (YR) with piG(σ, x) := σ(x) the evaluation function, trivial coplay function;
and EG(x, κ) := argmaxσ∈Σ κ(σ(x)) an equilibrium function describing the subset of the
strategies that maximises the utility of the agent.
Let us x three sets C, Q, A for corpora (i.e. lists of facts), questions and
answers respectively. Let U be a set of utilities, which can be taken to be R or B.
We now dene a closed game modelling an interaction between three agents:
a teacher, a student and a marker. For the moment we dene it in terms of
abstract sets and unspecied strategies, we will instantiate these in Section 5.
Example 1.4 (Teacher, student, marker). A teacher T : (C1) 9 (Q×AU ) is a utility-maxi-
mising player where each strategy represents a function turning facts from the corpus into
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pairs of questions and answers. A student S : (Q1) 9 (AU) is a utility-maximising player
where each startegy represents a way of turning questions into answers. A marker is a
strategically trivial open game M : (A×AU×U) 9 (11) with trivial play function and a coplay
function defined as κM(aT , aS) = (−d(aS , aT ), d(aS , aT )) where d : A×A→ U is a given
metric on A. Finally, we model a corpus as a strategically trivial open game f :
(1
1
)
9
(C
1
)
with play function given by pif (∗) = f ∈ C. All these open games are composed to obtain
a question answering game in the following way.
T S Mf C
Q
A
A
U
U (1)
Intuitively, the teacher produces a question from the corpus and gives it to the student who
uses his strategy to answer. The marker will receive the correct answer from the teacher
together with the answer that the student produced, and output two utilities. The utility
of the teacher will be the distance between the student’s answer and the correct answer;
the utility of the student will be the exact opposite of this quantity. In this sense, question
answering is a zero-sum game.
2 Pregroup semantics
Pregroup grammars are algebraic models of natural language syntax, rst in-
troduced by Lambek [Lam99]. They are weakly equivalent to context-free
grammars [BM07], can be parsed eciently [Pre07], and can be given functo-
rial semantics [CCS10, SCC13]. In this section we give background on pregroups
and their models in rigid monoidal categories.
Definition 2.1. A preordered monoid is a preorder P equipped with a monotone monoid,
i.e. a ≤ c ∧ b ≤ d =⇒ ab ≤ cd for all a, b, c, d ∈ P . A pregroup is a preordered monoid
P where every type t ∈ P has left and right adjoints tl, tr such that tlt ≤ 1 ≤ ttl and
ttr ≤ 1 ≤ trt.
Definition 2.2. A pregroup grammar is a tuple G = (V,B,D, s) where V is a set of
words called the vocabulary, B is a finite set of basic types with s ∈ B the sentence type,
and D ⊆ V ×PB is a finite set of dictionary entries for PB the free pregroup generated by
B.
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A pregroup grammar G generates a language L(G, s) ⊆ V ∗ as follows. A list of words
u ∈ V ∗ is grammatical, i.e. u ∈ L(G, s), whenever for each word ui ∈ V , i ≤ |u| there is a
type ti ∈ PB such that (ui, ti) ∈ D and t1 . . . tn ≤ s in the free pregroup.
In [PL07], Lambek and Preller recast the pregroup formalism in terms of
free compact 2-categories. We focus on the case of compact 2-categories with
one-object, i.e. rigid categories. Let Cat,MonCat and RigidCat denote the cat-
egories of categories and functors, monoidal categories and monoidal functors
and rigid categories and rigid functors, respectively. Given a set of generating
objects O, a simple signature over O is a graph Γ⇒ O, it generates the free cate-
gory C(Γ) ∈ Cat, [Sel10, 2.3]. A monoidal signature over O is a graph Γ⇒ O∗ and
it generates the free monoidal category MC(Γ) ∈MonCat, [Sel10, 3.3]. Finally
a rigid signature over O is a graph Γ ⇒ PO where PO is the free pregroup on O,
Γ generates the free rigid category RC(Γ) ∈ RigidCat, [Sel10, 4.8].
For a pregroup grammar G = (V,B,D, s), let G := RC(D ⇒ B + V ) be the
free rigid category generated by the dictionary entries, where the two maps
are given by projections, i.e. dom(w, t) = w and cod(w, t) = t for (w, t) ∈ D. The
grammatical structure of a sentence u ∈ L(G, s) may now be given explicitly by
a diagram g : u→ s in G. In general, for any basic type b ∈ B we will write:
L(G, b) =
∐
u∈V ∗
G(u, b)
Example 2.3. Take G = (V,B,D, s) with V = { sense,makes, this, sentence }, B =
{ s, n, d } and D = { (sense, n), (makes, nrsnl), (this, d), (sentence, dln) }. The following
string diagram is a proof that u = “This sentence makes sense” ∈ L(G, s) is a grammat-
ical sentence. We do not draw the wires for words and depict the dictionary entries as
triangles.
d
This
dr n
sentence
nr s nl
makes
n
sense
Going from inequalities in a preorderedmonoid to arrows in amonoidal cat-
egory allows both to reason about syntactic ambiguity (e.g. “men and (women
who run)” vs “(men and women) who run”) as well as to dene pregroup
semantics as a monoidal functor. This second observation lead to the develop-
ment of the DisCo (distributional compositional) framework [CCS08, CCS10].
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Definition 2.4. A DisCo model for a pregroup grammar G = (V,B,D, s) is a rigid
monoidal functor F : G→ S for S a rigid monoidal category, such that words are sent to
the unit F (w) = 1 for all w ∈ V . The semantics of a list of words u ∈ V ∗ with grammatical
structure g : u→ t is given by the state F (g) : 1→ F (t).
Example 2.5. Relational models F : G→ Rel correspond precisely to relational databases.
The basic types B correspond to a set of attributes, with F (b) the set of data values for
each b ∈ B. The dictionary D ⊆ V × PB corresponds to a database schema, and the
functor F to an instance of that schema, mapping each entry (w, t) ∈ D to a relation
F (w) ⊆ F (t) = F (b0) × F (b1) · · · × F (bk) where {bi} is the list of basic types in t (note
that F (br) = F (b) = F (bl) as Rel is compact closed). Finally, morphisms in G (and
sentences u → s in particular) correspond to conjunctive queries which can be evaluated
by applying the functor F , see [dMT19] where this correspondence is spelled out in detail.
Example 2.6. Distributional models F : G → VectR can be constructed by counting
co-occurences of words in a corpus [GS11]. The image of the noun type n ∈ B is a vector
space where the inner product computes noun-phrase similarity [SCC13]. When applied
to question answering tasks, distributional models can be used to compute the distance
between a question and its answer [CdMT18].
3 From pregroups to open games with snake removal
We now aim to give semantics to pregroup grammars in the category of open
games. As Game is not a rigid monoidal category, building such an interpre-
tation is more involved than the cases above. A rst attempt would be to use
the teleological structure of Game to interpret the cups in pregroup diagrams.
However, the models obtained in this way would be very limited: the image of
words are all states, i.e. they have trivial observations and co-utilities. This
motivated Hedges and Lewis [HL18] to dene the notion of a process grammar
as a free rigid category where the words are modeled as generators with arbi-
trary domains. We propose an alternative construction which does not require
any change to the pregroup formalism, using the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1 ([Del14]). The forgetful functor RigidCat → MonCat has a left adjoint
A : MonCat → RigidCat. Furthermore, the embedding functor C ↪−→ A(C) is strong
monoidal and fully-faithful.
The free completion A : MonCat → RigidCat is called autonomisation in
[Del14], given a monoidal category C it constructs a rigid monoidal category
6
A(C) by freely adding adjoints to the objects of C with formal cups and caps
witnessing the adjunctions.
In our context, this means that we can give semantics to pregroup grammars
in open games by constructing a DisCo model F : G → A(Game) with F (s) ∈
Game. Then, by fullness of the embedding Game ↪−→ A(Game), we get that the
image of any grammatical sentence g : u→ s in G is a morphism:
F (g) ∈ A(Game)(1, F (s)) ' Game(1, F (s)) .
In other words, once a functor of this type is constructed, all the cups and caps
from pregroup diagrams will cancel each other via the snake equation, leaving
us with a morphism in Game. We now give the main result of this section,
which will allow us to build language games functorially from any functional
pregroup grammar.
Definition 3.2. A pregroup type t ∈ PB is functional if it belongs to the context-free
grammar b | trt | ttl where b ∈ B. A pregroup grammar G = (B, V,D, s) is called functional
if each type in the dictionary t ∈ D(V ) is functional.
The restriction to functional types is very common in the literature on cate-
gorial grammar. They correspond to the syntactic types of combinatory catego-
rial grammars [Ste00] and of the product-free Lambek calculus [Fow08, Bus16],
as well as the original types used for Montague semantics [Mon70]. Even if
Lambek doesn’t state this restriction explicitly, all the pregroup types he uses
in his book [Lam08] are of this form.
Proposition 3.3. For any functional pregroup grammar G, there exists a monoidal signa-
ture ΓG and a functor FG : G→ RC(ΓG), such that any DisCo model F : G→ A(Game)
factors uniquely as F = A(J) ◦ FG for some J : MC(ΓG)→ Game.
Example 3.4. Fix a pregroup grammar G = (B, V,D, s) with B = {d, n, s} for determi-
nant, noun, sentence types. We use the dictionary:
D = {(the, d), (person, drn), (who, nrnsln), (explains, nrs), (knows, nrsnl), (rules, drn)}.
The following is a grammatical sentence.
The person who explains knows the rules.
(2)
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The monoidal signature ΓG associated withG is given by: ΓG = {the : 1→ d ; person, rules :
d → n ; explains : n → s ; knows : n⊗ n → s ; who1 : n → a⊗ n ; who2 : a⊗ s → n}. The
functor FG factors each dictionary entry using cups and the boxes in ΓG. For instance
every entry of the form (w, arb) ∈ D (including adjectives, common nouns and intransitive
verbs) and every transitive verb (v, nrsnl) ∈ D are factored as follows:
ar b
w 7→ ar a
b
w , nr s nl
v 7→ n
r n n nl
s
v . (3)
The factorization of “who” requires two boxes:
nr n sl n
who 7→
nr n
a n
s sl
n
who1
who2
. (4)
Note that this factorisation carries the same data as a comb in the sense of [KU17] or
equivalently of a lens, see [Rom20] for an account of the relationship between these notions.
Applying the functor FG to the sentence (2) and removing the snakes yields the following
diagram in MC(ΓG) ↪−→ RC(ΓG).
d n
a
n s
n
d n
s
the person who1
explains
who2
the rules
knows
We can now build games for each sentence by nding a functor J : MC(ΓG)→
Game. In the next section we will use this to obtain a game-theoretic seman-
tics for imperative and interrogative sentences.
4 Functorial language games
We start this section by recasting the example of a language game modelled in
[HL18] into our formalism. This is the rst example given in the Philosophical
Investigations [Wit53] and it features two players: a master builder and his
apprentice. The master gives instructions to the apprentice who helps him
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building with building-stones. They use a language consisting of the following
dictionary D = {(bring, snl), (large, nnl), (slabs, n), . . . } , where n, s ∈ B are the
noun and sentence type respectively. The master gives an order to his apprentice
by forming a grammatical sentence u ∈ O = L(G, s) where G = (B, V,D, s). We
can give a game-theoretic semantics to the master’s orders as follows. First,
the monoidal signature associated with G is ΓG = {bring : n → s, large : n →
n, slabs : 1→ n}, and the functor FG maps “Bring large slabs” as follows:
nl
Bring
n nl
large
n
slabs
s 7→
n
n
s
slabs
large
Bring
(5)
The interpretation as open games J : MC(ΓG) → Game is given by J(n) = N =
L(G,n) and J(s) = (OA) where A is a set of actions with a mapping bring : N → A,
i.e. every noun phrase x refers to some object in the building site and bring(x)
is the action that brings it. We interpret the nouns and adjectives syntactically,
i.e. J(slabs) = (slabs→ n) ∈ N and
J(large) : N −→ N :: x 7−→ large x .
The game is encoded in the image of the imperative “Bring”, which is inter-
preted as the open game J(bring) : (N1 )9 (OA) with trivial set of strategy proles
Σ = ? and play function: pi : ?×N → O : x 7→ (ids ⊗ cupn) ◦ (Bring ⊗ x) , analogous
to the the image of “large”. The coplay function is trivial and the equilibrium
E : N × (O → A)→ P(?) = B is given by:
E(x, k) =

1 k(pi(x)) = bring(x)
0 otherwise . (6)
Similar open games can be dened for other orders such as “cut” or “stack”.
Applying the functor J−K = A(J)◦FG to the diagram above, yields an open gameJBring large slabsK : (11) 9 (OA) with equilibrium function taking a continuation of
the apprentice k : O → A to:
EJBring large slabsK(k) =

1 k(Bring large slabs) = bring(large slabs)
0 otherwise
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In words, the master is satised when his order results in an action that brings
large slabs.
Now that we have illustrated the concept of language game with a simple
example, we move to a dierent setup replacing the master-apprentice lan-
guage with teacher-student pragmatics. We start by modelling the role of a
teacher examining his pupil, where orders are replaced by questions. Suppose
we are dealing with a philosophy teacher and take the following example:
D = { (who, qsln}, (invented, nrsnl), (truth, nnl), (tables, n) }
Who inv. truth tables ?
We model the teacher’s knowledge of his course with a DisCo model KT : G→
Rel such that KT (n) = KT (q) = A where A = {Fela,Wittgenstein,Peirce, . . . } is
a set of names of historical gures. The correct answers to a who-question
g : u → q are given by a subset KT (g) ⊆ A, thus the utility of the student with
strategy k : Q→ A is the intersection 〈k(g)|KT (g)〉 ∈ B, see example 2.5.
As in the previous example, we give a strategically-trivial semantics to each
of the words, except for the interrogative “Who” which we use to encode the
game. Note that the dictionary entry for “Who” factors via FG as follows:
Who
q sl n
7→
a n
s sl
q
Who1
Who2
(7)
The functor J : MC(ΓG) → Game is dened on objects by J(a) = J(n) = (N1 )
and J(q) = (QA) where Q = L(G, q) is the set of grammatical who-questions
and N = L(G,n) is the set of grammatical noun phrases. The rst part of the
factorization initializes the same noun variable x : 1→ n ∈ G in its two outputs:
piJ(Who1) = (x, x) : ? → N × N, and has trivial coplay function, strategy set and
equilibrium. The second play function substitutes the question word “Who”
for x in sentence g to build the question:
piJ(Who2) : N × S → Q : (x, g) 7→ g[x := Who].
It has trivial coplay function and strategy set and an equilibrium EJ(Who2) :
N ×S× (Q→ A)→ B given by EJ(Who2)(x, g, k) = 〈k(q)|KT (q)〉 for q = piJ(Who2)(x, g).
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As a result, the functor J−K = A(J) ◦FG maps the question “Who invented truth
tables?” to an open game with the following equilibrium function.
EJWho invented truth tables?K(k) =

1 k(Who invented truth tables?) ∈ {Witt.,Peirce}
0 otherwise
In words, the teacher is satised when the student answers his question cor-
rectly. Note that we could reverse the equilibrium to model a teacher that is
satised when the student gives the wrong answer. In the next section, we will
use this alternative choice to dene an adversarial question answering game.
5 Nash equilibria in a Q&A game
In Section 1, we dened an open game for question-answering using abstract
sets C, Q, A and U for corpus, questions, answers and utilities. Strategies
and plays for the agents were given by arbitrary functions between those sets.
We now instantiate those functions with respect to a pregroup grammar G =
(B, V,D, s) with a xed question type z ∈ B. We consider the case where utilities
are booleans U = B and leave the generalisation to any semiring for future work.
We take the corpus C to be a list of question-answer pairs (q, a) for q : u→ z
and a ∈ A. For simplicity, we assume q is a yes/no question and a is a boolean
answer, i.e. Q = L(G, z) and A = B. The strategies of the student are DisCo
models σ : G → Rel with σ(z) = 1, so that given a question q : u → z, σ(q) ∈
P(1) = B is the student’s answer. In practice, the student may only have a
subset of models available to him so we set ΣS ⊆ {σ : G → Rel : σ(z) = 1}. The
strategies of the teacher are given by indices ΣT = { 0, 1, . . . n }, so that the play
function piT : ΣT × (Q×A)∗ → Q×A picks the question-answer pair indicated by
the index. The marker will compare the teacher’s answer a with the student’s
answer σ(q) ∈ B using the metric d : A × A → B :: (a0, a1) 7→ (a0 = a1). Plugging
these open games as in Example 1.4, we can compute the set of equilibria of
the game by composing the equilibrium functions of its components.
EG = {(j, σ) ∈ ΣT × ΣS : j ∈ argmax
i∈ΣT
ai 6= σ(qi) ∧ σ ∈ argmax
σ∈ΣS
(aj = σ(qj))}
Therefore, in a Nash equilibrium, the teacher will ask the question that the
student, even with his best guess, is going to answer in the worst way. The
student, on the other hand, is going to answer as correctly as possible.
We can analyse the possible outcomes of this game.
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1. There is a pair (qi, ai) in C that the student cannot answer correctly, i.e.
∀σ ∈ ΣS : σ(qi) 6= ai. Then i is a winning strategy for the teacher and (i, σ)
is a Nash equilibrium, for any choice of strategy σ for the student. If no
such pair exists, then we fall into one of the following cases.
2. The corpus is consistent — i.e. ∃σ : G → Rel such that ∀i · σ(qi) = ai —
and the student has access to the model σ that answers all the possible
questions correctly. Then, the strategy prole (j, σ) is a Nash equilibrium
and a winning strategy for the student for any choice j of the teacher.
3. For any choice i of the teacher, the student has a model σi that answers qi
correctly. And viceversa, for any strategy σ of the student there is a choice
j of the teacher such that σ(qj) 6= aj. Then the set EG is empty, there is no
Nash equilibrium.
To illustrate the last case, consider a situation where the corpus has only
two elements C = { (q0, a0), (q1, a1) } and the student has only two models ΣS =
{σ0, σ1 } such that σi(qi) = ai for i ∈ { 0, 1 } but σ0(q1) 6= a1 and σ1(q0) 6= a0. Then
we’re in a matching pennies scenario, both the teacher and the student have no
incentive to choose any one of their startegies and there is no Nash equilibrium.
This problem can be ruled out if we allowed the players in the game to have
mixed strategies, which can be achieved with minor modications of the open
game formalism [GKLF19].
6 Conclusion
We studied the links between two recently developed applications of category
theory: open games and distributional compositional language models. We
constructed language games as functors from a pregroup grammar to the free
completion of open games as a rigid category and used this construction to give
a game-theoretic pragmatics for orders and questions. Finally, we analysed the
Nash equilibria of an adversarial Q&A game. Going towards implementation,
the next step is to dene a similar Q&A game in the category of learners of
Fong et al. [FST19], see [Hed19] for the relationship between learners and
open games. This would amount to instantiating the strategy sets with the
parameters of a learning algorithm, so that gradient descent converges to the
desired Nash equilibrium. It would allow to formalise a generative adversarial
learning algorithm [GPM+14] for question answering.
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